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1. Introduction 
 
Macroeconomists have long been interested in studying the stabilizing effects of 
different policies. More than fifty years ago Friedman (1948) advocated a non-
discretionary monetary and fiscal framework for stability. It was recognized in the early 
literature on fiscal policy e.g. by Musgrave and Miller (1948) that also progressive 
taxation operates as an automatic stabilizer to smooth business fluctuations.1 
      It is not always the case that fluctuations are bad for welfare, since the equilibria 
associated with stable cycles can be efficient. The resulting indeterminacy, i.e. the 
multiplicity of equilibria, however, can be an independent reason for stabilization policy 
as argued e.g. by Woodford (1984). An appropriate policy can render the equilibrium 
determinate, and thus possibly rid the economy from the effects of sunspots and 
bubbles.2 If fluctuations are chaotic, as sometimes is the case even in simple 
overlapping generations models, policies, which stabilize the economy, can also help 
agents to coordinate their actions more easily. 
The possibility of endogenous cycles in overlapping generations models was 
observed by Gale (1973) and Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1979). Grandmont (1985) 
elaborated their findings, and analyzed precisely the conditions for the existence of 
cycles. From the policy point of view Grandmont (1986a) pointed out that simple fiscal 
and monetary policies involving proportional transfers and lump-sum taxes (or 
transfers) can abolish cycles completely. In his demonstration of sunspot equilibria 
Aiyagari (1988) showed that there is a simple policy of proportional tax rate and lump-
sum transfers, which can stabilize the asset price completely and thus rid the economy 
from the effects of sunspots.3  
Woodford (1986) studied the model with an infinitely lived agent with similar 
preferences to what we have below, and with a finance constraint. Because of that 
constraint it turns out that consumption and labor supply decision in his model are 
identical to the decisions, which would be made by two-period lived agents in an 
                                                          
1 See also Vickrey (1945) and Slitor (1948). 
2 See especially section V in Woodford's (1984) survey, where he also discusses the policy responses to 
indeterminacy.  
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overlapping generations model. There are equilibrium fluctuations and sunspot 
equilibria in his model. Woodford showed that government expenditures adjusted to 
changes in private investment demand can stabilize the price level. Smith (1994) 
utilized a two-period overlapping generations model with money, storage and reserve 
requirements to study the effects of many types of monetary and fiscal policies on 
indeterminacy. He showed that indeterminacy is a pervasive feature under many 
policies, and furthermore that a certain inflation target can be achieved but often with a 
welfare cost meaning that the same target can be achieved by other policy measures 
with better welfare properties. 
Ghiglino and Tvede (2000) studied an overlapping generations model with a 
prescribed objective function for the government. They showed that if the discount 
factor is close to one, the optimal policy can completely stabilize the economy. Goenka 
(1994) advocated a role for discretionary policies in a general equilibrium model with 
public goods to abolish the sunspot equilibria, and thus stabilize the economy. Keister 
(1998) studied the effects of redistribution on the volatility of the economy and argued 
that models with indeterminacies can be useful vehicles for certain types of policy 
analyses. He showed e.g. that larger transfers lead to higher fluctuations in 
consumption. 
 There is a related literature, though not in an OG framework, in which the role 
of various tax schemes as stabilizing or destabilizing devices has been analyzed in 
models with inefficiencies and/or externalities. In these models the potential impacts of 
progressive, proportional and regressive taxation on cycles and indeterminacy have 
been studied. This literature includes Guo (1999), Guo and Lansing (1998, 2001), Guo 
and Harrison (2001, 2004), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997). Giannitsarou (2004) 
revisits the issue of indeterminacy and aggregate instability when government 
expenditures may be financed by consumption taxes as well.  
Aloi, Lloyd-Braga and Whitta-Jacobsen (2003) utilize an overlapping 
generations monetary model to study the impacts of fiscal policy rules on the 
determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium. This paper is closely related to our 
                                                                                                                                                                              
3 Guesnerie and Woodford (1992) in their survey on endogenous fluctuations touch on the issues of 
stabilization policy, but mainly from the point of view of preventing sunspot equilibria. 
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analysis. Their emphasis is not on taxation, but on discretionary fiscal policy rules, 
where government expenditures depend on the current and last period's outputs. They 
show e.g. that stabilization at the monetary steady state can be obtained by using a 
sufficiently ‘countercyclical’ rule for government spending. Moreover, they 
demonstrate that a sufficiently ‘procyclical’ rule will create indeterminacy.   
In both the OG and real business cycle models summarized briefly above, the 
stabilizing role of proportional and non-proportional taxes is sensitive to the details of 
model specifications. The source for cycles in our model is the same as in many 
overlapping generations models; the income effect dominates the substitution effect in 
an old agent's utility function. We re-examine the stabilizing effects of fiscal policies in 
a simple overlapping generations model by assuming, in contrast to Grandmont (1986) 
and Aiyagari (1988), that government uses distortionary taxes to maintain a balanced 
budget. In particular, we analyze the impact of proportional and linearly progressive 
taxes on cycles and the indeterminacy of equilibria, and briefly study the price level 
targeting as a stabilizing device.    
We show the following results. Under proportional taxation the steady state 
supply exceeds (falls short of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of the second period consumption, is higher (lower) than one. This is because the 
higher (lower) steady state supply in the presence of taxation is due to the fact that the 
positive income effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative 
substitution effect. Moreover, and importantly, in the presence of endogenous cycles, 
there is a critical level of tax rate above which there are no cycles. Under progressive 
taxation the steady state supply is less than the one with proportional taxation due to the 
negative income effect of tax exemption. In this case we show that there is a critical 
level of tax exemption, such that for all tax exemptions below that level there are no 
cycles in the economy. This is due to the fact that when tax exemption is low enough, 
the slope of the offer curve will become positive and cycles will vanish.   
We also characterize the effects of tax policy on the indeterminacy of equilibria, 
and demonstrate the following results. First, if the utility function is quasi-linear, 
increasing the tax rate can cause the equilibrium to become determinate both with 
proportional and linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter, 
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because the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption. Second, if the 
utility function is not quasi-linear, a relatively high tax exemption might make the 
equilibrium indeterminate due to non-zero income effect. Following the approaches of 
Woodford (1986), Aiyagari (1988), and Smith (1994) we also consider a policy, which 
completely eliminates fluctuations. We show that by fixing the target for the price level 
this can be done by either taxing or subsidizing young workers.  
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present an overlapping generations 
model with a balanced budget distortionary taxation. Section 3 characterizes 
competitive equilibrium with proportional taxation, the relationship between the level of 
taxes and endogenous cycles, and the impact of tax policy on the indeterminacy and 
determinacy of equilibria. In section 4 we ask what the implications of linearly 
progressive taxation are for cycles and indeterminacy. In section 5 we characterize price 
level targeting as a stabilizing policy. Finally, there is a concluding section. 
 
2. An Overlapping Generations Model with a Balanced Budget Fiscal 
Policy 
 
We consider a perfect foresight overlapping generations model with money and zero 
population growth. We assume the stock of money to be constant. Producer-consumers 
consume when old and produce when young. The person born at t  has the following 
additively separable lifetime utility function 
(1) )()(),( 11 tttt nvcuncU −= ++ , 
where 1+tc  denotes consumption when old, and tn  labor supply in youth. Labor is 
transformed to output, ty , in a linear fashion, i.e. tt ny = . )(cu  is an increasing strictly 
concave function, and )(nv  an increasing strictly convex function. We denote by  L   
the upper bound for the available time, and make the following assumptions: 
+∞=
→
)('lim
0
cu
c
, 0)('lim =
∞→
cu
c
, 0)('lim
0
=→ nvn  and +∞=→ )('lim nvLn . Given our assumptions 
it follows that 1)0('/)0(' <uv . This means that the slope of the indifference curve at the 
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endowment point is less than unity. Using the terminology in Gale (1973) we consider 
here a Samuelson case, which is needed for monetary equilibria in this model. 
We consider a fiscal policy with a balanced budget, where government taxes the 
output (income) produced by the young, and uses the revenues to buy output from the 
market. We study the potential effects of taxation both in terms of the relationship 
between the level of the tax rate and cycles as well as in terms of the determinacy of 
equilibria. We also compare the results of proportional taxation with those of linearly 
progressive taxation.  
To study the effects of progressive taxation in a simple manner we assume that 
there is a nominal exemption on the taxable income and a constant marginal tax rate, i.e. 
tt ∀=ττ .4  Total nominal tax revenues in period t  are thus 
(2) )( tttt EnpT −= τ , 
where ttnp  is the nominal tax base (i.e. price times output of the young), and tE  
denotes the nominal exemption, which we assume to be constant as well, i.e. tEEt ∀= . 
The average tax rate, )/1(/ ttttt npEnpT −=τ , is less than the marginal tax rate τ .  The 
tax schedule (2) is progressive in the sense that even though the marginal tax rate is 
constant, the average tax rate increases with the tax base. An increase in the average tax 
rate is higher the higher is the marginal tax rate and the tax exemption when the tax base 
goes up. 
The government budget constraint in the absence of debt financing is 
(3)  )( EnpTgp ttttt −== τ . 
We emphasize that the real government expenditure, tg , is not a given sequence, but it 
adjusts every period to the level necessary to maintain balanced budget. With 
proportional taxation the government budget constraint is tt ng τ= .  
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3. Competitive Equilibrium with Proportional Taxation 
 
In this section we study the effects of proportional taxation, and provide answers to the 
following questions. First, given the existence of endogenous cycles, can the 
proportional taxation eliminate them? And second, what is the effect of the tax rate on 
the determinacy of equilibrium.  
We first study the properties of competitive equilibrium in the presence of 
proportional taxation. The private sector periodic budget constraints are  
(4i) tt
d
t npM )1( τ−=  
(4ii) dttt Mcp =++ 11 , 
and the lifetime constraint is 
(5)   t
t
t
t np
pc
1
1
)1(
+
+
−= τ . 
The young producers accumulate money by selling their output to the old, and part of it 
to the government. The first-order condition for the utility maximization subject to the 
periodic budget constraints (4i) and (4ii) is 
(6)  )(')1(')1(
11
tt
t
t
t
t nvn
p
pu
p
p =


 −−
++
ττ . 
The solution to (6) gives the young’s supply function [ ]1/)1( +−= ttt ppnn τ . If supply is 
increasing in the after tax real wage ( 1/)1( +− tt pp τ ), a rise in the tax rate will decrease 
supply. If supply is downward sloping, the reverse happens so that an increase in the tax 
rate will increase supply. 
 The equilibrium condition for the goods market is  
(7)  tt
t
d
t ng
p
M =+−1 . 
Taking into account the government budget constraint, tt ng τ= , and the fact that the 
nominal money supply is constant, we rewrite (7) as 
                                                                                                                                                                              
4  For the definition of progressive taxation, see the seminal paper by Musgrave and Thin (1948). See also 
Lambert (2001), chapters 7-9 for further analyses. Sandmo (1983) and Koskela and Vilmunen (1995) 
provide different applications. 
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(8) t
t
n
p
M )1( τ−= . 
Using equation (8) in the first-order condition (6) we can re-express it as 
(9)   [ ] )(')1(')1( 11 tttt nvnnun =−− ++ ττ , 
This equation determines the equilibrium sequence of supplies for a given tax rate, and 
implicitly defines the reflected generational offer curve.5 The steady state equilibrium is 
determined from [ ] )(')1(')1( nvnu =−− ττ . Given the Inada conditions and the feasible 
tax rates, 10 <<τ , it is straightforward to see that the steady state is unique. 
 In order to explore the impact of tax policy we first ask: How does the steady 
state solution to (9) (denoted by nˆ ) compare to the steady state supply without 
proportional taxation (denoted by *n )? The answer is given in  
 
Proposition 1. Under proportional taxation the steady state supply exceeds (falls short 
of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
the second period consumption (or the Arrow-Pratt measure of the 
relative risk aversion), denoted by σ , is higher (lower) than one, i.e. 
                                                 *ˆ nn






<
=
>
  as .1






<
=
>
σ  
 Proof: Rewriting equation (9) in the steady state as 
[ ] )()(')1(')1();( nRHSnvnunLHS ≡=−−≡ τττ , and given the Inada conditions, we 
have 0)0( =RHS , ∞=
→
)(lim nRHS
Ln
, and 0)(' >nRHS . We also have 0);( <τnLHSn . 
We calculate [ ] [ ]nnununLHS )1('')1()1(');( τττττ −−−−−= , and re-express it as 
[ ]( ))(1)1(');( nnunLHS στττ −−−= , where [ ] [ ]nunnun )1('/)1('')1()( τττσ −−−−= . 
Note that consumption in steady state is n)1( τ− . When 1)( >nσ , the curve );( τnLHS  
shifts up, if the tax rate is raised and vice versa when 1)( <nσ . The results of 
Proposition 1 follow from these observations. Q.E.D. 
                                                          
5 The geometric techniques of the reflected generational offer curves, developed by Cass, Okuno and 
Zilcha (1979), are useful for characterizing properties of equilibria in many overlapping generations 
models.  
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  Proposition 1 follows from the Slutsky equation. The higher (lower) steady state 
supply with than without taxation is due to the fact that the positive income effect of the 
tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative substitution effect (for a precise 
elaboration of this intuition, see Appendix). The Slutsky equation can be written as 
m
c nnnn −= ττ , where cnτ  is the negative substitution effect and mnn−  the positive 
income effect. The latter (former) effect - evaluated at 0=m  - dominates if 
.1)()( <>nσ   
In order to derive the slope of the offer curve we differentiate (9) to get 
(10) [ ] [ ]1121
1
)1('')1()1(')1(
)('')('
+++
+
−++−−
+=
ttt
ttt
t
t
nunnu
nvnnv
dn
dn
ττττ . 
 
We drop the subscripts and note that the second period consumption equals n)1( τ− . 
Equation (10) cannot be signed generally since the sign of the denominator is a priori 
ambiguous. Defining [ ] [ ]{ }nnununD )1('')1()1(')1()( ττττ −−+−−=  we can express it 
as 
(11)  ( ) [ ][ ] 


−
−−+−−=
nu
nnununD
)1('
)1('')1(1)1(')1()( τ
ττττ  
We define ( ) ( )[ ]nunnun )1('/)1('')1()( τττσ −−−−= , which is the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of the second period consumption. Using this definition equation (11) 
can be rewritten as [ ])(1)(')( nnunD σ−= . So we conclude that 0)( >nD , when 
1)( <nσ . This means that it is necessary for backward bending offer curve (and indeed 
for endogenous cycles) to have 1)( >nσ . 
To explore the stabilizing effect of proportional taxation on cycles we use the 
following notation for the two parts of equation (9), presented above 
(12)   [ ] [ ]nnunU )1(')1(; τττ −−≡  and )(')( nnvnG ≡ .6 
Since function )(nG is monotone increasing we can invert it, and obtain the following 
relation 
(13)  [ ]( ) )(; 111 ++− Φ≡= ttt nnUGn ττ . 
                                                          
6  Here we follow Grandmont (1986a), and partly Aiyagari (1988). 
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which is actually the inverted reflected generational offer curve. Note that this equation 
describes the backward dynamics of equilibrium. If there is no τ  subscript in (13), it 
then refers to the case without taxation.  
 Given (13) we say that there is indeterminacy, if the absolute value of the slope 
of τΦ  at the steady state is greater than unity. This also means that the corresponding 
forward dynamics is locally stable, i.e. equilibria are indeterminate. And, if that slope is 
less than unity, then the steady state is determinate.7  
To make this problem interesting from the point of view of endogenous cycles 
and the potential tax effects on them we assume that there can be cycles in our model 
economy even in the absence of exogenous shocks. For the existence of a two-cycle (or 
a periodic point with period two) it is necessary that function )(nΦ (economy without 
taxation) is downward sloping. That property, however, is not sufficient for periodic 
solutions of higher order. To have periodic points with period three and more, it is 
necessary that the curve, )( 1+Φ= tt nn , must be hump-shaped. More precisely, if there 
are at least three cycles in the economy without taxation (see Figure 1), there must be 
periodic solutions of any order higher than three according to Sarkovskii’s theorem.8 It 
is also well known that cycles in overlapping generations models are intimately 
connected with sunspot equilibria.9 Below we present a parametric specification of our 
model and provide conditions under which we get a hump-shaped offer curve. 
Next we ask: Is there a proportional tax policy, which can eliminate cycles? We 
provide a positive answer in the following proposition.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), especially chapter 5, discuss thoroughly the concept of indeterminacy 
in OG models.  
8 An elementary discussion and elaboration of Sarkovskii’s theorem can be found e.g. in Holmgren 
(1996), in particular chapter 5. On the conditions for the existence of endogenous cycles of more than 
two periods in economic models, see e.g. Grandmont (1986b). 
9 Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) showed that a two-cycle is enough for the existence of stationary 
sunspot equilibrium.   
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Proposition 2. There is a critical level of tax rate, τˆ , such that for all ττ ˆ>  there are 
no  endogenous cycles in the economy. 
Proof: Let 'n  be the maximum of the function )(nΦ  such that ')'( nn >Φ . We see that 
the maximum for the function )(nτΦ  is at )1/(' τ−n . The maximizing point of )( 1+Φ tnτ  
can then be increased in such a way that ultimately we have for some τ , say τˆ , that 
[ ] )ˆ1/(')ˆ1/(' τττ −<−Φ nn . It follows that 0)ˆ('1 >Φ> nτ , where nˆ  is the respective 
steady state, which in turn means that there can be no cycles. Q.E.D. 
According to Proposition 2 a sufficiently high proportional tax rate will 
eliminate cycles by changing the location and slope of the inverted reflected 
generational offer curve. In Figure 1 we have described an economy without taxation 
but with cycles (curve )( 1+Φ= tt nn ) and an economy with high enough proportional 
taxation, and with such a policy that there can be no cycles (curve )( 1+Φ= tt nn τ ). The 
steady state is stable in backward dynamics, and is denoted by n)  in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.
*n'n
tn
1+tn
)( 1+Φ= tt nn τ
)( 1+Φ= tt nn
nˆ
 
 
To be able to study more explicitly the relationship between proportional 
taxation, endogenous cycles and indeterminacy, we consider a parametric example, 
which allows for backward-bending reflected generational offer curve. We specify the 
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quasi-linear utility function10 as follows: The consumption preferences are described by 
)1/()()( 1 σσ −+= −accu , where a  denotes a luxury of consumption11, and the 
preferences for disutility of labor are linear, nnv =)( . We assume here that 1>σ , which 
lies in conformity with empirics12 and yields possibly interesting dynamics. Note that 
now the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is not constant, but 
equals )/( acc +σ , and is thus an increasing function of consumption. Under these 
specifications the supply function can be written as 
(14)  
)1(
)1(
1
1111
1 ττ
σσ
−−−= +
−−
+
t
tt R
aRn , 
where we have used the notation: 11 / ++ = ttt ppR . Differentiating (14) with respect to the 
interest factor and the tax rate we get 
(15i) 


 +−

 −−=∂
∂
+
−
+
−
+
aRR
R
n
tt
t
t σσ τσ
στ
11
1
2
1
1
1
)1(1)1(  
(15ii)   
1
1
1 +
+
∂
∂


−−=∂
∂
t
ttt
R
nRn
ττ . 
These equations show that the interest factor and the tax rate have an opposite effect on 
supply. Clearly, the supply function can be backward bending with respect to the 
interest factor, if 1>σ . Hence, given the interest factor, for all the tax rates, which 
fulfill the condition 111
1 −+


−−< tRa
σ
σ
σ
στ , the supply function is backward bending 
with respect to the tax rate. This means that decreasing the tax rate will decrease the 
supply and vice versa if 111
1 −+


−−> tRa
σ
σ
σ
στ . 
 Next we analyze the properties of competitive equilibrium for this example with 
the assumption that 1>σ . Utilizing the equilibrium condition (9) we get 
(16)    [ ] tt
t n
an
n =+−
−
+
+
στ
τ
1
1
)1(
)1( , 
                                                          
10 Quasi-linearity is often used in the welfare analyses to simplify the presentation, see e.g. Laffont 
(1988), 158-161.  
11 For a further discussion of this specification , see e.g. Auerbach and Hines (2002).    
12 See e.g. the survey by Attanasio (1999).   
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and in the steady state )1/()1(ˆ
11 ττ σ −−−== − annt . Note that the steady state without 
taxes is an −=1* . By direct differentiation with respect to the tax rate we see that 
*ˆ nn > , if 0)1(
1
>−− aστ . This latter condition is fulfilled naturally, since it equals 
consumption ( n)1( τ−= ) in the steady state.13 Differentiating (16) we get 
(17)   [ ] 11
1
2
1 )1(
)1()1)(1(
+
+
+
+ +−
−+−−=∂
∂
στ
ττσ
an
an
n
n
t
t
t
t . 
To get the hump-shaped offer curve described in Figure 1, and thus to allow for periodic 
solutions of order higher than two we need to have the maximum of the offer curve, 
)1)(1/( τσ −−a , to be less than the steady state, )1/()1( 1
1
ττ σ −−− − a . This will lead to 
the following inequality for the proportional tax rate, τσ
στ
σ
ˆ
1
1 =


−−<
a . If the tax rate 
exceedsτˆ , there can be no cycles in this economy as noted in Proposition 2. 
Finally we explore the indeterminacy of equilibrium. Evaluating the slope of 
(17) at the steady state yields 
(18)    
σ
σ
τ
στσ
1
1
1 )1(
)1)(1(*)(
−
+−−==∂
∂
+
ann
n
n
t
t
t , 
where the numerator should be negative for cycles. For the determinacy of perfect 
foresight dynamics we need 1/ 1 −>∂∂ +tt nn , and thus get the condition  
(19) 11
)1(
1 1 <−








−
−
στ
σ a , 
which implies that the tax rate must fulfill the following inequality 
τσ
στ
σ
~
2
1 =


−−>
a , and ττ ~ˆ > . According to (19) increasing the tax rate above τ~  
guarantees the determinacy of equilibrium. Whether this happens depends also on the 
magnitudes of the luxury of consumption, ,a  and the parameter,σ , which affects the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. It is important to emphasize that to 
                                                          
13 See also Proposition 1. 
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completely abolish the endogenous cycle, i.e. when the offer curve is upward sloping, 
we need a rather high tax rate (τˆ ). To make the backward dynamics stable (i.e. the 
requirement for determinacy), but still maintaining the downward sloping offer curve, it 
is enough to have a lower tax rate thanτˆ . 
 
4. Competitive Equilibrium with Linearly Progressive Taxation 
 
In this section we study the effects of linearly progressive taxation from the same 
perspective as we did for proportional taxation, and compare the results to those 
presented above.  
The private sector periodic budget constraints are now  
(20i)   EnpM tt
d
t ττ +−= )1(  
(20ii) dttt Mcp =++ 11 , 
so that the lifetime constraint is 
(21)  
1
1
)1(
+
+
+−=
t
tt
t p
Enpc ττ . 
The young producers accumulate money by selling their output again to the old and the 
government. The first-order condition for the utility maximization subject to budget 
constraints (20i) and (20ii) is  
(22)  )(')1(')1(
11
t
t
tt
t
t nv
p
Enpu
p
p =


 +−−
++
τττ , 
which implicitly defines the young’s supply function, 


 −=
++ 11
,)1(
tt
t
t p
E
p
pnn ττ . The 
equilibrium condition in the goods market is again  
(23) tt
t
d
t ng
p
M =+−1 . 
Taking into account the government budget constraint and the fact that the nominal 
money supply is constant we can rewrite (23) for periods t and t+1 as 
(24) EnpM tt ττ +−= )1( , EnpM tt ττ +−= ++ 11 )1( . 
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It follows that 11 ++= tttt npnp , which means that the tax base stays constant also outside 
the steady states. Note also that we must have the following natural condition for the 
policy parameters: 1/ <MEτ . Now we can develop the first-order condition above as 
(25)  )('')1(
1
1
t
tt
t nv
p
Mu
n
n =


−
+
+τ . 
From (24) we solve
1
1 )1( +
+ −
−=
t
t n
EMp τ
τ , and plug into (25) to obtain 
(26)   )('
1
)1(')1( 11 tttt nvn
M
E
nun =








−
−− ++ τ
ττ , 
which determines the equilibrium sequence of supplies. If the second period preferences 
are logarithmic, the dynamics is determined from the condition MEnvn tt /1)(' τ−= , i.e. 
the economy stays forever at the steady state, n~ , determined from MEnvn /1)~('~ τ−= . 
It is also interesting to note that the level of nominal money supply affects the 
intertemporal allocation in the presence of progressive taxation.   
  Next we ask: How does the steady state solution to (26) (denoted by n~ ) under 
progressive taxation compare to the steady state with proportional taxation, nˆ ? The 
answer is given in  
 
Proposition 3. The steady state supply with progressive taxation is less than the supply 
with proportional taxation. 
Proof: We rewrite equation (26) in the steady state as 
[ ] )()('))/(1/()1(')1(),;( nRHSnvMEnuEnLHS ≡=−−−≡ ττττ . Given the Inada 
conditions we have 0)0( =RHS , ∞=
→
)(lim nRHS
Ln
, and 0)(' >nRHS . We also have 
0),;( <EnLHSn τ , [ ] 0))/(1/()1('')1)(1(),;( 2 <−−−−= − MEnnuMM
EEnLHSE ττττττ  
so that the ),;( EnLHS τ  shifts down, when tax exemption is increased. Proposition 3 
follows from this finding. Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 3 is natural, since in competitive models progressive taxation is more 
distortionary than proportional taxation. This is because a higher level of tax exemption 
decreases the steady state supply due to the negative income effect of tax exemption on 
supply.  
To explore the stabilizing effect of taxation on cycles we use the following 
notation in equation (26)  
(27)   [ ]








−
−−≡
M
E
nnuEnU τ
τττ
1
)1(')1(,;ˆ  and )(')(ˆ nnvnG = . 
Since function )(ˆ nG is monotone increasing we can invert it, and obtain from (27) the 
following relation 
(28)  [ ]( ) )(,;ˆˆ 111 ++− Φ≡= tEtt nEnUGn τ , 
which is again the inverted reflected generational offer curve, where subscript E  refers 
to the case of linearly progressive taxation. If there is no subscript in (28), it then refers 
to the case without taxation. Obviously the same definition for indeterminacy as above 
for τΦ , applies here for EΦ . Again we assume that there is at least a two-cycle in the 
economy without taxation (see Figure 1). As with proportional taxation the hump-
shaped form of equation (28) is not necessary for two cycles, but it is necessary for 
three cycles.14  
Is there a progressive tax policy, which can stabilize the economy by eliminating 
endogenous cycles? We provide the answer in the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 4. Given the marginal tax rate there is a critical level of tax exemption, ,Eˆ  
such that for all ,EˆE <  there are no endogenous cycles in the economy. 
Proof: Let 'n  be the maximum of the function )(nΦ  such that ')'( nn >Φ . The 
maximum for the function )(nτΦ is thus at )1/(' τ−n , and for the function )(nEΦ  at 
)1/(')1( ττ −− n
M
E . The maximizing point of )( 1+Φ tE n can then be increased by 
                                                          
14 See footnote 7 above. 
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decreasing E  in such a way that ultimately we have for some E , say Eˆ , that 
)ˆ1/(')1()ˆ1/(')1( ττττ −−<

 −−Φ n
M
En
M
E
E . This also means that 0)~('1 >Φ> nE , where 
n~  is the respective steady state, which in turn means that there can be no cycles. Q.E.D. 
 
Hence, according to Proposition 4 a sufficiently low progressive taxation – 
meaning that the average tax rate does not increase with the tax base too much - will 
eliminate endogenous cycles. This is because lower tax exemption will decrease the 
income effect and thus will change both the slope and location of the offer curve. When 
exemption is low enough, the slope will become positive and cycles will vanish.    
Next we consider our parametric example specified in section 3 above to explore 
the issue of indeterminacy. Analogously to the derivation of the supply function with 
proportional taxes (c.f. equation 15) we get 
(29)   
tt
tt p
E
R
aRn
)1()1(
)1(
1
1111
1 τ
τ
ττ
σσ
−−−−−= +
−−
+ , 
where the term, tpE / , is the real exemption. Differentiating (29) with respect to the tax 
rate, and the tax exemption we get 
(30i)  
t
tt
t
p
EaRRn 2
11
1
1
1
2 )1()1(1)1( −+
−
+
− −−


 +−

 −−−=∂
∂ ττσ
σττ
σσ   
 (30ii)  
t
t
pE
n
)1( τ
τ
−−=∂
∂ . 
For a given interest factor decreasing the tax rate will decrease the supply (i.e. 
0/ >∂∂ τtn ), if the marginal tax rate and tax exemption fulfill the following condition 
(31)  11
11
1 −+
+



 +


−−≤
σ
σσ
σ
στ t
tt
R
p
E
R
a . 
Now we analyze the determinacy of competitive equilibrium for this specification 
again with the assumption that 1>σ . Using equation (26) we obtain 
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(32)  t
t
t n
a
M
E
n
n =








+
−
−
−
+
+
σ
τ
τ
τ
1
)1(
)1(
1
1 , 
where we calculate the steady state τ
τττ σ −−−−−=
−
1
)1()1)(1(~
11 a
M
E
M
En .  This can be 
expressed in terms of the steady state with proportional taxation as n
M
En ˆ)1(~ τ−= . 
Hence, introducing tax exemption, which makes taxation progressive, decreases the 
steady state supply compared to the case with proportional taxation (see Proposition 3).   
 Differentiating (32) yields 
 
(33)  1
1
1
2
1
1
)1(
)1(
1
)1)(1(
+
+
+
+








+
−
−
−+
−
−−
=∂
∂
σ
τ
τ
ττ
τσ
a
M
E
n
a
M
E
n
n
n
t
t
t
t . 
 
Evaluating the slope at the steady state we get 
(34) 
σ
σ
τ
στσ
1
1
1 )1(
)1)(1()~(
−
+−−==∂
∂
+
ann
n
n
t
t
t , 
where the numerator must be negative. We get the condition for determinacy as 
(35)  11
)1(
1 1 <−








−
−
στ
σ a . 
Decreasing the tax rate can cause indeterminacy, i.e. if τ  decreases enough the 
inequality sign turns around depending on the relative size of parameters a  and σ .15  
Note that this condition is exactly the same (c.f. equation (19)) as with the presence of 
                                                          
15 This can also be seen by differentiating the left-hand side of (35) with respect to the tax rate, and noting 
that the partial derivative will be negative. 
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proportional taxation. This is due to the quasi-linear specification of the utility function, 
which is strictly concave in consumption and linear in leisure and labor supply. 
Therefore the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption so that tax 
progressivity does not matter here. 
Finally we consider an example where – unlike in the case of quasi-linear utility 
function - the income effect for consumption is not zero. We assume that disutility 
function ( )(nv ) is of the form 2)4/1()( nnv = . This gives the following equilibrium 
dynamics 
(36)  2
1
1
2
1
1
)1(
)1(
t
t
t n
a
M
E
n
n =








+
−
−
−
+
+
σ
τ
τ
τ . 
While we cannot explicitly solve for the steady state, we, however, get from (36) the 
following relation at the steady state 
(37) );()1(2
1
)1(),,;( τττ
ττ
σ
nRHS
n
a
M
E
nMEnLHS ≡−=








+
−
−≡ . 
The left-hand side of (37) is an increasing, and the right-hand side a decreasing function 
of supply, .n  Furthermore, we see from (37) that 0)),,;( >MEnLHSE τ . This means that 
an increase in the level of exemption will shift the ),,;( MEnLHS τ  curve up, so that 
there is a negative relationship between the steady state employment and exemption, i.e. 
0/ <∂∂ En .  
 Using (36) we get 
(38)  
t
t
t
t
t
n
a
M
E
n
a
M
E
n
n
n 1
1
)1(
1
)1)(1()1(
1
1
1
1
×








+
−
−








+
−
−−−
=∂
∂
+
+
+
+
σ
τ
τ
τ
τστ
, 
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Again we concentrate on the case, where 1>σ , so that the above slope can be negative. 
Next we evaluate the slope at the steady state. Using the steady state characterization 
from (37) and evaluating (38) at the steady state we obtain 
(39)  








+
−
−








−
−−+
−
−
=∂
∂
=
+
a
M
E
n
M
E
na
M
E
n
n
n
ntn
t
t
τ
τ
τ
τστ
τ
1
)1(2
1
)1(
1
)1(
*
1 )1(2)1(2
)1()1)(1(
M
Ean
M
Ean
ττ
ττσ
−+−
−+−−
= . 
Hence (39) provides the following condition for the determinacy of equilibrium 
(40)  1
)1()1)(1(
)1(2)1(2
−<
−+−−
−+−
M
Ean
M
Ean
ττσ
ττ
. 
Taking into account the fact that, in the case we are considering, the left-hand side of 
(40) must be negative, we get from the denominator the following inequality for 
exemption 
(41)  

 −−−>
a
nME )1)(1(1 τστ . 
We can re-express (40) as 
(42)  

 −−−<
a
nME
3
)1)(3(1 τστ . 
Hence (41) and (42) provide bounds for the level of exemption, and thereby for 
determinacy to hold. In this example it is necessary for determinacy that 3>σ . In 
particular, if σ  is just slightly greater than three (42) holds for sure and we have 
determinacy. Thus, there is an upper bound for tax exemption as already suggested by 
Proposition 4 above. Tax exemption matters for determinacy because of non-zero 
income effect. Since the steady state employment is a decreasing function of exemption, 
both sides of (42) are increasing functions of exemption. Increasing the level of 
exemption might switch the inequality around, and make the steady state indeterminate, 
if the effect of a change in exemption on supply is not very large. 
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5. Price Level Targeting as a Stabilizing Policy 
 
We briefly discuss here an example of a policy, which will stabilize the economy 
completely, i.e. we look for a policy under which the only equilibrium is stationary. We 
partly follow Woodford (1986), Aiyagari (1988), and Smith (1994), who discuss 
different policies in the same sense. The young are taxed and the proceeds are directly 
transferred to the old. This means that the amount of the nominal money supply stays 
constant as above. Consider now the following tax policy: the policy authority chooses 
a benchmark price level, *p , and taxes the young workers by a proportional rate 
tpp /*1− . If 1/* >tpp , the workers are subsidized and the old are taxed. The 
decision problem of the young is to maximize the lifetime utility function, 
)()( 1 tt nvcu −+  subject to the budget constraints   
(42i) tt
t
tt
d
t npp
pnpM )*1( −−=  
(42ii) 111 +++ += tdttt SMcp , 
where 1+tS  is the subsidy (if positive) they get in the second period of their lives. The 
first-order condition is 
(43) )('*'*
1
1
1
t
t
tt
t
nv
p
Snpu
p
p =


 +
+
+
+
. 
The goods market equilibrium condition in period t is 
(44)  t
t
t
d
t n
p
SM =+−1 . 
Subsidy in equilibrium will be ttt nppS *)( −= , and the nominal money supply is 
constant, i.e. MMt =  for all t . It then follows that tnpM *= . We can now rewrite the 
first-order condition, (43), as 
(45) )
*
('
*
'*
1 p
Mv
p
Mu
p
p
t
=



+
, 
which can be solved for a unique price level. Thus the only equilibrium is stationary. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
We have studied the effects of distortionary taxation on endogenous cycles and the 
determinacy of equilibria in a competitive overlapping generations model with money 
and a balanced budget rule for fiscal policy. In particular, we have explored the 
implications of proportional and progressive tax systems.  
We have shown that under proportional taxation the steady state supply exceeds 
(falls short of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the 
second period consumption, is higher (lower) than one. This is because the higher 
(lower) steady state supply in the presence of taxation is due to the fact that the positive 
income effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative substitution 
effect. Moreover, and importantly, in the presence of cycles there is a critical level of 
tax rate such that for all higher tax rates there are no cycles in the economy. The steady 
state supply under progressive taxation is less than the one with proportional taxation 
due to the negative income effect of tax exemption on supply. In this case there is a 
critical level of tax exemption, such that for all smaller tax exemptions there are no 
cycles in the economy. When tax exemption is low enough, the slope of the offer curve 
will become positive and cycles will vanish.  
We have also characterized the effects of tax policy on the determinacy of 
equilibria by providing the following results. First, if the lifetime utility function is 
quasi-linear, increasing the tax rate can make the equilibrium determinate both with 
proportional and linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter. 
This is because the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption.  Second, if 
the lifetime utility function is more general, then tax exemption might matter because of 
the income effect. But for a small tax rate an increase in progression can bring about 
determinate equilibria. We have also shown that policy, which fixes a target for the 
price level, can completely eliminate fluctuations in the economy.  
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Appendix: 
 
                           Derivation of the Slutsky equation for the supply function 
 
Maximizing the utility function )()( nvcuU −=  subject to mnc +−= )1( τ , where m  is 
non-labor income, gives )(')1)(('0 nvcuUn −−== τ , which implicitly defines the 
supply function ),( mnn τ= . Substituting this for n  in U gives the indirect utility 
function oUmU =),(* τ  with the following properties: 0)(' ** >= cuUm  and 
.0** <−= mnUUτ Given the monotone *mU  we can invert the indirect utility function for 
m  so that we have the following expenditure function, ),( oUhm τ= . Substituting this 
for m  in oUmU =),(* τ  yields the compensated indirect utility function (see Diamond 
and Yaari, 1972) oo UUhU =)),,((* ττ with the following property 0** =+ ττ UhUm  so 
that .** nUUh m =−= ττ  According to the duality theorem we can write the relationship 
between the uncompensated and the compensated supply as 
follows ),()),,(( oco UnUhn τττ = . Differentiating this with respect to the tax rate gives 
c
m nhnn τττ =+  which can be written as the Slutsky equation  mc nnnn −= ττ  , where we 
have the negative substitution effect, )0
)('')1)((''
)('( 2 <−−= nvcu
cunc ττ , and the        
positive income effect, )0
)('')1)((''
)(''( 2 >−−=− nvcu
ccunnm τ . The latter (former) effect         
evaluated at 0=m  dominates if .1)()( <>nσ  
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